

PREPARING THE SCOUT PLATOON FOR COMBATING AN INSURGENCY

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General Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

PREPARING THE SCOUT PLATOON FOR COMBATING AN INSURGENCY, by
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The trends of the operational environment either provide a cause for an insurgency or a means for an insurgency, thus shifting the focus of the scout platoon away from major combat and towards insurgency. This shift to insurgency causes the scout platoon to shift its focus from the enemy to the population. Furthermore, recognizing how these factors affect the scout platoon enables the US Army to understand how to prepare the scout platoon. The scout platoon must shift its focus to gathering information on and from the population. To train the scout platoon to gather information on and from the population, the commander must resource the platoon with a trained population with which to interact. The commander must also focus the scout platoon on the proper tasks; ones oriented on gathering information from people affected by the trends in the operational environment. Finally, the commander must establish standards for the platoon that ensures these tasks have the desired effect on the population. Scout platoons play and will continue to play a vital role in operations in the insurgency band of the spectrum. As trends dictate a focus on insurgency, the US Army needs to understand how to prepare its organizations. This study concludes that preparing the scout platoon for the insurgent environment provides valuable insights into preparing the rest of the US Army.

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ACRONYMS

AO	Area of Operations
ARC	Army Reconnaissance Course
BAT	Biometric Assessment Toolkit
BOLC	Basic Officer Leader's Course
CA	Civil Affairs
CATS	Combined Arms Training Strategies
CCTT	Close Combat Tactical Trainer
CEXC	Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell
CFV	Cavalry Fighting Vehicle
DLI	Defense Language Institute
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EST	Engagement Skills Trainer
FM	Field Manual
HBCT	Heavy Brigade Combat Team
HCT	Human Collection Teams
HMMWV	High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IBCT	Infantry Brigade Combat Team
JIEDDO	Joint Improvised Explosives Defeat Organization
LPD	Leaders Professional Development
LRAS3	Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System
mm	Millimeter
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty

MP	Military Police
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPFOR	Opposing Force
PMESII-PT	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time
POI	Program of Instruction
PSYOPs	Psychological Operations
SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
STP	Soldier Training Publication
STX	Situational Training Exercise
TADSS	Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations
TiGRNET	Tactical Ground Network
TOW	Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wire-guided missile
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
VTC	Video Tele-conference
WIT	Weapons Intelligence Team

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As demonstrated in current doctrine, battlefields of the future will be complex. Full Spectrum Operations is the change to U.S. Army doctrine that allows it to deal with this complexity. To prepare for operations, U.S. Army units conduct training. Training for the full spectrum prepares Army units to be successful by depicting the environment in which they operate. Current trends indicate a shift away from major combat operations to insurgency. In insurgency, the focus is less on the enemy and more on protecting a population. To be successful in this environment, U.S. Army units require more information on the population. Scout platoons play a unique role in gathering this information and must be properly trained.

The topic of this thesis is the training of the reconnaissance and scout platoon that prepare this platoon to provide information to the commander in an insurgency. To address this topic, this study explores the unique aspects of the insurgency environment, the training the platoon requires to operate in this environment, and the methods the platoon uses to conduct this training. This study is largely based on U.S. Army doctrine and is done at the unclassified level.

I am qualified to complete this thesis because I am an Armor officer and Cavalryman. I am a graduate of the Scout Platoon Leader's Course, now the Army Reconnaissance Course. Additionally, I served as a Scout Platoon Leader while conducting stability operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a Captain, my cavalry experience includes reconnaissance planner for a Heavy Brigade Combat Team, Headquarters and Headquarters' Company Commander, and operational experience

working with a combined arms battalion scout platoon in Iraq. Finally, as an instructor at Fort Knox's Maneuver Captains Career Course, I was responsible for instructing captains on the employment of scout platoons.

Background

Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, states that today's complex operational environment requires full spectrum operations.¹ Full Spectrum Operations is defined as a mixture of offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations in differing proportions dependent upon what portion of the spectrum of conflict the U.S. Army is operating.² The spectrum of conflict is a band that increases from stable peace through unstable peace and insurgency to general war (see figure 1).³




Figure 1. Spectrum of Conflict

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 2-1.

Over the past eight years, the U.S. Army has combated insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Based on the spectrum of conflict, insurgency is categorized by a mixture of major combat operations, irregular warfare, and limited intervention (see figure 2).⁴ In an insurgency, the U.S. Army conducts this mixture of operations among indigenous societies in an effort to defeat our enemies and assist a nation in securing its population. The insurgent mitigates U.S. involvement by operating close to the people and population

centers.⁵ To deal with this challenge and others, the U.S. Army developed its counterinsurgency doctrine.




Figure 2. The Spectrum of Conflict and Operational Themes

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 2-2.

Counterinsurgencies focus on legitimizing the government while isolating the insurgency from the people.⁶ Legitimacy is a key to the counterinsurgents effort because the side that claims victory must be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the population.⁷ In most cases, the counterinsurgent addresses the root cause of the insurgency with the legitimate government in order for the operation to be a success.⁸ A historic driving factor of these operations is the premise that “intelligence drives operations,”⁹ and this intelligence is focused on the people.¹⁰

The Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon plays a part in the intelligence effort. It serves as an information collector for the commander in his area of operations and is present in the reconnaissance squadron of every one of the U.S. Army's brigade combat team formations.¹¹ By seeking information, scouts enable full spectrum operations. They conduct reconnaissance and security operations to acquire tactical information about the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations of an area to assist the commander in making decisions.¹² This information once analyzed becomes intelligence.

Training is how the U.S. Army prepares to conduct any operation to include information gathering. It is conducted at the individual level by focusing on individual tasks and at the unit level by focusing on collective tasks. In accordance with FM 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, Training takes place both at deployed locations to sustain proficiency and at home station to build "tactical and technical competence"¹³ which builds "confidence and agility."¹⁴ In short, training is the basis for success in all operations.¹⁵ Therefore, if the scout platoon is going to be successful in operations, it must be well trained.

The Army focused in the past on training its forces for major combat operations and general war with the premise that if units can achieve success in major combat operations they can easily transition to the other portions of the spectrum.¹⁶ Recent operational experience shows that this is a false assumption.¹⁷ Therefore, the U.S. Army adapted its training doctrine to prepare itself for full spectrum operations. Training for full spectrum requires training for a mixture of offensive, defensive and stability operations (see figure 3). Dependent on the operational environment a unit is projected to face, U.S. Army units vary the proportion of offensive, defensive and stability tasks in

their training. FM 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, calls this tenet of training, “Train as you fight”¹⁸ and has expanded the concept of fighting to include the full spectrum of operations.¹⁹




Figure 3. Examples of Combining the Elements of Full Spectrum Operations within Operational Themes

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 2008), 3-20.

In its doctrine the U.S. Army identifies trends that are creating persistent conflict. These trends are highlighted in FM 3-0, *Operations* and are: globalization, technology, demographic changes, urbanization, resource demand, climate change and natural

disasters, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and effects and failed or failing states.²⁰ These trends serve as causes for insurgency and means of the insurgent and set the focus of training for this environment.

Doctrine takes time to implement across the force. This study is significant because it addresses the challenges of implementing full spectrum doctrine with respect to the scout platoon. By isolating the aspects of training, the operational environment, and the scout platoon, the U.S. Army gains insights on training full spectrum operations.

This thesis assumes that the operational environment will continue along the trends of: globalization, technology, demographic changes, urbanization, resource demand, climate change and natural disasters, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and effects and failed or failing states.²¹ It makes this assumption to provide a framework for analysis and conclusions. Since there are various types of scout platoons, this paper focuses on the scout platoons located in the reconnaissance squadron of the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) and the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). It assumes that the findings will transfer to the other types of scout platoons.

According to FM 3-0, *Operations*, “Successful mission accomplishment requires understanding the operational environment.”²² As the environment changes, the information collectors whose reports contribute to situational understanding adapt. Scout platoons are one of these collectors. As the U.S. Army adapts to full spectrum operations, the scout platoon adapts its training to support this change. The end result is situational understanding which is a building block to overall mission accomplishment. The next

chapter explores the available literature on the topics of the operational environment, counterinsurgency, training, and the scout platoon.

¹US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 3-1.

²*Ibid.*, 3-20.

³*Ibid.*

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵*Ibid.*, 1-3.

⁶*Ibid.*, 1-20.

⁷US, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-2.

⁸*Ibid.*, 1-21.

⁹*Ibid.*, 1-27.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 3-1.

¹¹US, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-20.98, *Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 1-1.

¹²*Ibid.*, 3-1.

¹³US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1-5.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵US Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1-20.

¹⁶US Department of the Army, FM 7-0, 1-6.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 2-5.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰US Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1-1.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid., 1-21.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The scout platoon of the reconnaissance squadron collects information through reconnaissance and security operations. This information contributes to the commander's situational understanding of his operational environment. Because the operational environment has changed from one that was general war focused to one that is insurgency focused, the commander requires more information on the population in order to understand his environment. Therefore, the scout platoon must collect more population-centric information. In order to collect this information successfully, the platoon must be well trained in operating amongst the population. This chapter explores literature pertaining to training the scout platoon to operate in an insurgency.

Initially, this paper focuses on current U.S. Army doctrine, specifically the doctrine of the scout platoon. The primary source for this information will be FM 3-20.98, *Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon*. For context and insight into the operational environment and insurgency, this review explores literature on future war and the future environment and then shifts to the doctrinal publications of FM 3-0, *Operations* and FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. Once a basis for the scout platoon and insurgency is established, this document explores training. In order to provide a baseline of Army Training Doctrine, FM 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations* is reviewed. Once the foundation for Army training is understood, specific scout training is examined focusing on the tasks in which a scout is trained. The individual tasks are found in Soldier Training Publications (STP) for the Cavalry Scout, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 19D. Training tasks for the platoon as a collective organization are found in the Combined

Arms Training Strategies (CATS). Next, this paper reviews the Army Reconnaissance Course's Program of Instruction (POI) and the Armor Basic Officer Leadership Course's Program of Instruction to gain a perspective of how reconnaissance leaders are trained. Finally, this study explores the pertinent periodicals with a focus on determining what scout platoons are currently training and executing in terms of operating in the insurgency band.

Field Manual 3-20.98, *Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon*

FM 3-20.98, *Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon* is the doctrinal basis for all scout platoon operations. This manual contains the tasks expected from the reconnaissance and scout platoon and focuses on the platoon's employment in full spectrum operations. This FM begins with an overview of the operational environment and frames the challenges at the platoon level. *Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon* discusses command and control, reconnaissance operations, security operations, other tactical operations, and enablers. FM 3-20.98 also includes appendices that focus on: orders and reports; site exploitation; urban operations; fratricide prevention and combat identification; composite risk management and environmental protection; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations; essential field data; and demolition and obstacles. Although often focusing its examples in the major combat operations band of conflict, it stresses the applicability of the scout platoon's doctrine to full spectrum operations.

The overview highlights the different types of scout platoons, their organizations, and their strengths and limitations. The Infantry Brigade's scout platoon supports a brigade organized to conduct operations in restricted terrain (see figure 4).¹ Its major systems are the Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wire Guided (TOW) missile, the Long

Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3), the M-2 .50 caliber machine gun, and the MK-19 40millimeter (mm) grenade launcher. All of these systems are High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) mounted. This platoon consists of 18 personnel, a factor which limits its ability to both dismount and man its vehicles.




Figure 4. IBCT Motorized Reconnaissance Platoon

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-20.98, *Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 2009), 1-13.

The Stryker Brigade's scout platoon consists of four reconnaissance variant Stryker vehicles (see figure 5). This platoon's major systems are the LRAS3, the M-2 .50 caliber machine gun and the MK-19 40mm machine gun. It supports a brigade designed to operate in small scale contingencies.² The platoon is made up of 21 personnel to include four Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collectors.




Figure 5. SBCT Reconnaissance Platoon

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-20.98, *Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 2009), 1-16.

The final platoon, the Heavy Brigade's scout platoon, consists of a mix of three M-3 Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicles (CFV) and 5 HMMWVs (see figure 6). It supports a brigade developed to conduct full spectrum operations.³ The CFV is a tracked vehicle equipped with a 25mm cannon and a TOW missile launcher. The HMMWVs of the platoon have the LRAS3 and either the M-2 .50 caliber machine gun or the MK-19 40mm grenade launcher. The platoon is manned by 30 personnel.




Figure 6. HBCT and CAB Reconnaissance Platoon

Source: U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM) 3-20.98, *Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. August 2009), 1-10.

The reconnaissance chapter relates information gathering across the spectrum. Scout platoons conduct reconnaissance to collect information on the terrain, the enemy, or the population. They are encouraged to use the operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time (PMESII-PT) when planning. Scout platoons conduct three types of reconnaissance missions: route, area, and zone reconnaissance. These missions can be tailored based on

the information the commander requires and the time available to conduct the mission. Surveillance is considered an integral part of reconnaissance and is planned in detail for these operations. Reconnaissance missions are offensive in nature and the primary means by which scout platoons gather information.

Security missions are another means of gathering information. The security chapter covers security operations for all contingencies to include focused sections on local and area security operations and the tasks associated with each. Security missions are enemy focused and provide the commander with early warning. This information allows the commander to react maintaining his freedom to maneuver. Scout platoons conduct screens, local security and area security missions. These missions are defensive in nature and also include surveillance.

The scout platoon also conducts other tactical operations. These tasks include: tactical movement, assembly areas, link-up operations, relief in place, passage of lines, cordon and search, observation posts, dismounted patrols, and patrol bases and combat outposts. Cordon and search discusses the tactics, techniques and procedures the platoon uses when conducting operations to isolate and search an area. These operations occur frequently in counterinsurgency. Dismounted patrols also occur frequently during counterinsurgency operations and are the primary means for the scout platoon to interact with the population. Finally, the patrol bases and combat outposts section discusses the tactics necessary for the platoon to live in close proximity to the population.

The manual concludes with a series of appendices. Of note for counterinsurgency were the appendices on site exploitation and urban operations. Appendix B, Site exploitation, discusses the consideration to gather information during

the search phase of any operation that involves searches. Appendix C, Urban operations, covers the fundamentals of conducting operations in built-up areas. Both are important for the platoon in insurgency because they provide it considerations to operate in and around a population.

The Operational Environment

In his book *The Post American World*, Fareed Zakaria discusses in detail the trend of globalization and how it has affected the world. He contends that globalization is growing the economies of developing nations like China, India, and Brazil.⁴ As these countries grow, so does their pride or nationalism.⁵ Nationalism then creates conflict.⁶ Zakaria then discusses modernity and its affect on culture contrasting modernity with westernization.⁷ He explores China and asserts with China's economic turn toward capitalism, democracy will follow.⁸ This internal shift will have global affects.⁹ Zakaria goes on to discuss China's need for natural resources and the competition and friction this creates.¹⁰ He uses the example of Zimbabwe, which China trades weapons with for raw materials. These weapons are then used by the Zimbabwean government to oppress its population.¹¹ In this example, Zakaria is highlighting just one of the challenges related to the trend of resource demand. Later in his book, Zakaria goes on to state the U.S. will remain involved militarily in world affairs because of our world status; however, it is this involvement that is straining our own economy.¹² He concludes with six guidelines that the U.S. should use for future foreign affairs. Of note the guidelines of thinking asymmetrically and legitimacy is power directly correlate to military involvement.¹³

Thomas L. Friedman also discusses globalization and its effects in his book, *The World is Flat*. Friedman asserts that the world has been flattened by globalization. He

discusses how technology has interconnected the world and that this interconnectivity has made it easier for us to communicate and do business.¹⁴ Friedman describes the latest era of globalization in terms of interconnecting individuals and allowing them to collaborate.¹⁵ This ability has allowed all aspects of society to outsource certain functions around the world with little degradation in capability.¹⁶ Technology and its use also allow individuals to broadcast ideas giving more people access to information through the internet.¹⁷ This empowers people both in a business sense and in a political sense.¹⁸ Friedman warns this is not without risk asserting there is no watchdog of the internet that assures its information is accurate.¹⁹ In theory, the internet is policed by its users.²⁰ Friedman discusses the nation state as the largest inhibitor to this process of collaboration and information sharing and it is their controls that are ultimately preventing some nation states from sharing in the benefits of globalization.²¹

Friedman also discusses some of the friction points with globalization. He includes the rise of terrorist networks like Al Qaeda whose ideals include preventing foreign influence in Arab countries.²² Friedman explains the friction point with globalization and technology and how it is degrading our ability of interpersonal interaction by tying us directly to machines and not people.²³ He discusses how nations with a surge in their population will contend with unemployment if they are not savvy when it comes to globalization.²⁴ Friedman explains competition for resources and its potential to create conflict using the example of China's quest for more oil.²⁵ He concludes this upturn in the use of oil and other fossil fuels is exacerbating our planets climate issues and contends that the United States must take the lead through conservation and development of cleaner energy sources through technology.²⁶ He also

concludes that nations with large oil reserves are at a disadvantage with respect to globalization because oil money is not being used by these nations to improve the conditions for their populations or to make them competitive in the future.²⁷ Friedman concludes that all of these aspects have made the world both more productive and more dangerous and uses the example of Osama Bin Laden's quest for weapons of mass destruction to illustrate this point.²⁸

Another writer on the future of warfare, Robert H. Scales, discusses the operational environment in a tactical sense in his study, "The Past as Prologue: Future Wars through the Lens of Contemporary Conflict." Scales begins with the premise that the U.S. has not been challenged by an enemy in a conventional fight since World War II because of its dominance; therefore, the U.S. is not likely to face a conventional threat in the near future.²⁹ Strategically enemies of the U.S. must only outlive them; they do not have to destroy U.S. forces.³⁰ This is consistent with insurgencies U.S. forces faced in Iraq and Afghanistan and underscores some of the operational trends. The unconventional threat the U.S. faces is adept at using war fighting technologies asymmetrically against U.S. ground forces.³¹ They are also adept at hiding from U.S. airpower.³² This enemy uses complex terrain such as urban areas to hide among the population and mitigate U.S. stand-off.³³ Because it mitigates many of the U.S. Army's strengths, this form of warfare is appealing to healthy states, failing states and non-state actors.³⁴ Success against enemies using irregular tactics requires acquiring information from the populace and getting information to the populace.³⁵

Many other authors and experts write about the impacts on the environment of the trends: globalization; technology; demographic changes; urbanization; resource demand;

climate change and natural disasters; weapons of mass destruction, their effects and their proliferation; and failed and failing states. Robert D. Kaplan in his article “The Coming Anarchy” illustrates these impacts by focusing on Africa.³⁶ Kaplan adds the trends of crime, disease and culture.³⁷ He highlights how these trends are creating conflict in Africa and uses them to predict future conflict in the world.³⁸

Thomas P.M. Barnett in his article “The Pentagon’s New Map” highlights these trends in terms of countries successfully functioning in the era of globalization, or the core, and countries that are having challenges with globalization, or the gap.³⁹ He asserts that the gap nations are where conflict will emanate.⁴⁰ Barnett lists Haiti, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, the former Yugoslavia, Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, South Africa, Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Somalia, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea, Indonesia, China, Russia, and India as gap nations.⁴¹ Some of these countries U.S. forces operate in today.

The National Intelligence Council’s 2020 project report *Mapping the Global Future* lists twenty-six certainties in terms of what are most likely trends and what are key trends.⁴² In this list references to globalization; technology; demographic changes; resource demand; climate change and natural disasters; weapons of mass destruction, their effects and their proliferation; and failed and failing states are made or put another way the only trend not mentioned is urbanization.⁴³ The National Intelligence Council’s 2025 project report *Global Trends: A Transformed World* highlights these trends differently by listing four relative certainties and their likely impacts and three key uncertainties and their consequences.⁴⁴ Again the only trend that lacked focus in this list was urbanization although it is addressed in the text.⁴⁵ As this literature review shifts to

U.S. Army doctrine and in particular FM 3-0, it demonstrates how the paradigm of: globalization; technology; demographic changes; urbanization; resource demand; climate change and natural disasters; weapons of mass destruction, their effects and their proliferation; and failed and failing states, presents a means to discuss the operational environment of the scout platoon.

Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*

FM 3-0, *Operations*, provides the basis for the Army's concept of full-spectrum operations. It is the Army's capstone manual and provides the Army a doctrinal reference for conducting land operations. This manual assists this study in framing the problem of training a scout platoon. It provides detail on two important concepts: the operational environment and the spectrum of conflict.

The operational environment is "a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander."⁴⁶ Today's environment is characterized as one of persistent conflict. The major concern during this era is the threat of instability, particularly the instability created by extremist and terrorist organizations.⁴⁷ These organizations capitalize on certain worldwide trends, and it is these trends that shape the operational environment.⁴⁸ These trends are: globalization; technology; demographic changes; urbanization; resource demand; climate change and natural disasters; weapons of mass destruction, their effects and their proliferation; and failed and failing states.⁴⁹

Globalization is an economic trend where markets become more global.⁵⁰ Global markets have created prosperity for some, but it has also created poverty. Poverty creates conflict between nations and creates vulnerabilities that extremist organizations can

exploit. The source of geopolitical conflict comes mainly from the developing nations in the southern hemisphere resenting the wealth of the developed nations in the northern hemisphere. Impoverished people are, also, more susceptible to extremist organizations and their ideals seeing them as a means of balancing wealth. This trend leads to more power for these organizations. If these organizations gain enough power internationally, they become a non-state actor. As globalization continues to expand, more and more nations are feeling the pressure from these actors and their populations who desire a share of the worldwide prosperity.

Technology has created a poverty of another kind.⁵¹ Nations with a developed industrial base are able to provide user friendly low cost devices to their populations. The low cost of these devices also makes them available to failing states and terrorist organizations. Technology can also be used by extremist organizations to communicate a message of hate. This message helps them recruit from alienated populations building on their power and therefore making it as dangerous as it is helpful.

Nations already challenged to provide for their people are experiencing a growth in their youth population.⁵² This population growth in young people benefits terrorist organizations by providing more people to recruit and recruits that are malleable to their doctrine. Population growth contributes to the challenge in the operational environment by placing more demand on an already stressed economic system.

As the world's population becomes more interconnected and the economy more global, there is also a trend of urbanization.⁵³ Urbanization is the trend of people leaving agrarian lifestyles and moving to cities to find work. This effects the environment by creating more stress on city infrastructure. This stress challenges governments to provide

for their populations by expending limited resources on infrastructure and security. Because of the significant challenges in securing urban environments, extremist organizations can create areas, where the population is sympathetic to their cause. These areas protect the actions of the organization by overwhelming security infrastructure and government. As cities grow, they become nation states and face similar challenges as they attempt to control extremist organizations.

Competition over resources also causes conflict.⁵⁴ In this era, the resources nations compete over will be energy resources and water. This competition stresses governments by pitting internal prosperity versus regional diplomatic stability. This dichotomy causes the increase in competition and ignites anger creating conflict in between states and in between populations within states.

Natural disasters and climate change makes these existing conditions more difficult.⁵⁵ Climate change is leading to desertification which makes an already dwindling water supply even more critical.⁵⁶ It challenges people worldwide to choose between water for irrigation and water for consumption. Because of the increased number of people in cities created by urbanization, when natural disasters strike cities the challenges are exacerbated. Natural disasters lead to humanitarian crisis and fuel the fire of groups focused on pointing out the inequalities of the world and the inability of states to provide for their people.

Weapons of mass destruction are a direct threat to stability.⁵⁷ If they fall into the hands of terrorist organizations, they can be used to create massive amounts of casualties and destruction. These weapons tie to technology, as the internet makes it easier to spread these weapons worldwide. Countries possessing these capabilities must secure them, a

challenge for failing and failed states. Finally, in an environment where these weapons exist, forces must be prepared to function in their after effects.

Failed and failing states provide sanctuaries for non-state actors and terror organizations.⁵⁸ These states provide freedom to these organizations and allow them to plan and execute operations as well as recruit others to their cause. As states weaken, their ability to care for their population and combat these organizations creates conflict. This conflict can plunge nations into chaos and turmoil.

The other concept found in FM 3-0, the spectrum of conflict, depicts a scale of increasing violence which begins with stable peace and moves through unstable peace and insurgency to general war (see figure 1). Under this sliding scale of violence are contained the operational themes: major combat operations, irregular warfare, peace operations, limited intervention, and peacetime military engagement (see figure 2). As outlined previously, this study focuses on insurgency. The insurgency band focuses on the themes of major combat operations, irregular warfare and limited intervention. It is important to note that although insurgency focuses on these themes, the other themes of peace operations and peacetime military engagement must be understood in order to identify differences in training techniques. This manual goes on to explain each of these themes in detail.

FM 3-0 defines peacetime military engagement as, “all military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime.”⁵⁹ It goes on to describe these operations in terms of multinational training events and exercises, security assistance, joint combined exchange training, recovery operations, arms control, and counterdrug operations. As related to the spectrum these operations

take place in a permissive non-violent environment with the purpose of promoting stability in a region.

Peace operations are defined as the broad category of responses from a whole of the U.S. government to assist during a limited contingency or crisis.⁶⁰ They are characterized as peacekeeping, peace building, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and conflict prevention. Their primary purposes are to prevent violence from spreading, and reduce tension of the parties that are in conflict. These operations are often conducted partnered with other nations under the auspices of an international mandate or charter, such as a mandate from the United Nations. Peace operations focus on the unstable peace portion of the spectrum of conflict.

Limited interventions focus on achieving a clearly defined end state that is limited in scope.⁶¹ They include: non-combatant evacuation operations, strike, raid, show of force, foreign humanitarian assistance, consequence management, sanction enforcement, and elimination of weapons of mass destruction. These operations take place across the lower end of the spectrum of violence but do not extend into general war.

Irregular warfare is “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over a population.”⁶² Irregular warfare spans the insurgency and unstable peace portion of the spectrum of conflict. It includes the joint military operations of foreign internal defense, support to insurgency, counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, and unconventional warfare.⁶³ Key aspects of irregular warfare include a regular force pitted against an irregular force, warfare among the people, and a focus on political power. To be successful in irregular warfare, the other instruments of national

power (diplomatic, information, and economic) must be integrated with the military instrument.

Major combat operations occur during general war.⁶⁴ They are the most violent of operations and are characterized by increased tempo, increased use of resources and increased casualties.⁶⁵ Major combat operations focus on defeating or destroying an enemy force and seizing terrain in order to protect our national interests. Although typically major combat operations occur against another nation's military these operations also include civil wars and can occur during an insurgency.

The operational themes discussed in FM 3-0 provide the basis for exploring training the scout platoon for the insurgency band. Counterinsurgency, one of the major undertakings of units facing an insurgency, is part of the irregular warfare theme. Therefore, it is important to look at the doctrine of counterinsurgency to understand the aspects involved in this form of operation.

Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*

FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, provides the background on fighting an insurgency. It begins with a discussion of insurgency and counterinsurgency. It defines insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”⁶⁶ It goes on to discuss the aspects of insurgency such as the use of terrorist or guerrilla tactics by a weaker enemy against a stronger U.S. force. It addresses the information environment and its criticality to this form of combat. Key to the discussion is the focus not just on the insurgent but on the people. Because insurgency is about political power and not military capability, it is imperative to identify information on both the insurgent and the people.

Since the scout platoon collects information that becomes intelligence, it is important to understand the concept of intelligence and counterinsurgency. “Counterinsurgency is an intelligence driven endeavour.”⁶⁷ Because the operational environment is so dynamic with both insurgent and counterinsurgent pitted against each other for the will of the people, all assets available must be focused on gathering information about the environment. The emphasis of this information gathering activity is focused on the populace, the host nation and the insurgents. From the analysis of the information, the counterinsurgent commander gains intelligence which then informs his future operations.

Field Manual 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*

FM 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, is the U.S. Army’s capstone manual for training. It begins by determining what has changed between the training the U.S. Army conducted in the past that requires the shift to training for full spectrum operations. Its focus is persistent conflict and the various threats which the Army will face in a future where there is no single enemy to model our training but a number of different threats. These threats are categorized as: traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive. This study focuses on irregular and disruptive threats because of their relevance to the insurgency band of the full spectrum.

Irregular threats and disruptive threats are very similar. Irregular threats are enemies that use “unconventional and asymmetric methods and means” to negate U.S. advantages.⁶⁸ Disruptive threats seek to negate or reduce U.S. strengths with the use of emerging or breakthrough technologies. The difference between these two threats is the

disruptive threats focus on technology that gives it a superior capability in one aspect whereas irregular threats may seek technology in this way it is not their primary focus.

FM 7-0 goes on to describe seven principles of training. These principles are: Commanders and other leaders are responsible for training, Non-commissioned officers train individuals, crews and small teams, train as you will fight, train to standard, train to sustain, conduct multi-echelon and concurrent training, and train and develop agile leaders and organizations. Most important to this study are the concepts of: commanders and other leaders being responsible for subordinate training, training a unit as it will fight, and training a unit to a standard. Because commanders are responsible for training, they dictate tasks a sub-unit will train and they resource this training. To ensure a unit is trained as it will fight the commander and other leaders must ensure that the conditions of the battlefield are depicted in the training. Finally, the commander must ensure that the tasks trained are completed to a measurable standard such as those found in individual and collective tasks training or the commander must establish a standard in the event that one does not exist.

FM 7-0 describes the Army Training System, which consists of the operational, institutional, and self-development domains. The operational domain is the training that occurs in U.S. Army units. The institutional domain is the training that occurs at U.S. Army schools and is overseen by the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The self-development domain is the training an individual undertakes to improve on his or her own. The focus of this study is on the institutional domain and the operational domain. For the scout platoon the institutional domain resides at the Maneuver Center of Excellence within TRADOC. The operational domain for the scout

platoon consists of the scout platoons within the modular brigade reconnaissance squadrons operating under the Army Force Generation construct.

Finally, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations* describes the Army Training Management system. This system is capabilities based and focuses on providing the joint force with the capabilities it needs to be successful on the land battlefield. For the modular brigade this process begins with its mission essential tasks. These are the tasks the modular brigades train on to provide the capabilities needed by the joint force commander. These tasks become part of the brigade's mission essential task list. The process eventually leads to the collective tasks that the scout platoon will conduct that support the battalion and then brigade's mission essential task. The supporting individual tasks then are the individual tasks that are completed that support the collective task. It is important to note that each of these task include a task, a set of conditions and a standard.

Individual and Collective Task Doctrine

STP 17-19D1-SM through STP 17-19D4-SM, which is the doctrinal individual training tasks for a scout private through scout platoon sergeant, show in detail the tasks, conditions, and standards that should be achieved by a scout Soldiers at these levels. The majority of these individual tasks are applicable in all environments if the conditions are adjusted and are therefore relevant to this study.

The Armor Basic Officer Leaders Course (BOLC) II Program of Instruction depicts the training a Scout Platoon Lieutenant must master. It is important to note that this TRADOC course does not just focus on the Scout Platoon Leader, it also focuses on the Tank Platoon leader and therefore all the tasks instructed are not relevant to this

study. This course certifies an officer can successfully employ a scout platoon in full spectrum operations and serves as the basis for the Armor officer's future development.

The Army Reconnaissance Course (ARC) Program of Instruction provides the tasks relevant for any leader in the scout platoon. This course utilizes a variety of classroom, simulated, and live training environments to produce competent reconnaissance leaders. It is important to note that this course takes the place of the Scout Leader's Course and incorporates elements of the Ranger's Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader's Course with elements of the Scout Leader's Course.

Current Articles

Recent magazine articles focus on operations that demonstrate success when applying counterinsurgency doctrine or Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) that have been applied in an insurgency environment. None of the articles discuss the scout platoon as an information gathering asset. In fact, most platoons are used interchangeably with respect to their capabilities and the scout platoon is no different. There are no articles that specifically focus on scout platoon training for an insurgency.

The lack of periodicals is due to the fact that the reconnaissance squadron of the brigade is filling the same role as the other battalions of the brigade. Intelligence and by extension information is at a premium in insurgency. To collect information, brigades utilize all of their assets in a similar manner assigning areas to all of their subordinate maneuver units. Reconnaissance squadrons, their troops, and the scout platoon are operating in a similar fashion as any other platoon in the brigade. This is supported by the scout platoons being utilized as infantry and tank platoons. Therefore, it is unlikely to find articles that are training specific for scout platoons.

A review of the extensive Fort Leavenworth library of Masters of Military Art and Sciences (MMAS) theses reveals numerous papers on the scout platoon. Of note, an MMAS Monograph by, then Major Terry Wolff put into context the importance of the scout platoon by tying success of a unit at the National Training Center to the success of that unit's reconnaissance organization in accomplishing its mission. His study illuminates the history of the recce platoon since Vietnam and emphasizes the importance of the platoon to operations. This thesis was written in 1990 and focuses only on scouts conducting major combat operations in a general war environment, not insurgency.⁶⁹

For more information on the history and organization of the scout platoon, Craig S. Harju's white paper entitled, "A Study of the Maneuver Battalion Scout Platoon" is examined. This study highlights the historical changes in the scout platoon and depicts the organization from World War II until 1989. Its premise is that a platoon can be either equipped to fight or equipped to gather information with each of these coming at the detriment of the other.⁷⁰ The history of the scout platoon is expanded in John J. McGrath's study, *Scouts Out! The Development of Reconnaissance Units in Modern Armies*. McGrath concurs with Harju's assessment that reconnaissance units can either be equipped to fight or equipped to gather information through stealth.⁷¹ The dilemma posed historically either fight for information or gather information stealthily transcends into training. Therefore, the platoon has to balance training to fight with training to gather information.

As an information gathering asset within the brigade currently operating in insurgency, it is important to understand how the scout platoon trains. Doctrine and literature contain insights into training a scout platoon; however, more research is

required to exhaust this topic. In the next chapter, the methodology for this paper is discussed with respect to the operational environment, training and the scout platoon.

¹US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2006), A-6.

²Ibid., A-8.

³Ibid., A-3.

⁴Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2008), 3

⁵Ibid., 32-33.

⁶Ibid., 33-34.

⁷Ibid., 86.

⁸Ibid., 102.

⁹Ibid., 104.

¹⁰Ibid., 115.

¹¹Ibid., 118.

¹²Ibid., 221.

¹³Ibid., 244, 247.

¹⁴Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat* (New York: Picador, 2007), 6-7.

¹⁵Ibid., 10.

¹⁶Ibid., 39.

¹⁷Ibid., 45-46.

¹⁸Ibid., 95.

¹⁹Ibid., 123.

²⁰Ibid., 121-122.

²¹Ibid., 236-237.

²²Ibid., 423.

²³Ibid., 516.

²⁴Ibid., 562.

²⁵Ibid., 373-374.

²⁶Ibid., 577.

²⁷Ibid., 626-628.

²⁸Ibid., 603.

²⁹Robert H. Scales, *The Past is Prologue: Future Warfare through the Lens of Contemporary Conflicts* (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, 2009), 12.

³⁰Ibid., 10.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid., 11.

³³Ibid., 27.

³⁴Ibid., 11.

³⁵Ibid., 17.

³⁶Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Magazine* (February 1994), <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/4670/> (accessed 17 May 2010).

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Thomas P. M. Barnett, "The Pentagon's New Map," *Esquire Magazine*, 1 March 2003, http://www.esquire.com/ESQ0303-MAR_WARPRIMER?click=main_sr (accessed 17 May 2010).

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²National Intelligence Council, *Mapping the Global Future Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project* (Pittsburgh, PA: Government Printing Office, 2004), 8.

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), iv-v.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

⁴⁶US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1-1.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 1-1.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*

⁴⁹*Ibid.*

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 1-2.

⁵¹*Ibid.*

⁵²*Ibid.*

⁵³*Ibid.*

⁵⁴*Ibid.*

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 1-3

⁵⁶*Ibid.*

⁵⁷*Ibid.*

⁵⁸*Ibid.*

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 2-5.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 2-8 – 2-9.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, 2-7 – 2-8.

⁶²*Ibid.*, 2-10

⁶³*Ibid.*, 2-4.

⁶⁴Ibid., 2-13.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 2006), 1-1.

⁶⁷Ibid., 3-1.

⁶⁸US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 2008), 1-2.

⁶⁹Major Terry A. Wolff, “Tactical Reconnaissance and Security for the Armor Battalion Commander. Is the Scout Platoon Combat Capable or Combat Ineffective?” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 1990), 40-43.

⁷⁰Craig S. Harju, Sr. *White Paper – A Study of the Maneuver Battalion Scout Platoon* (Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armor School, 18 September 1989), 2.

⁷¹John J. McGrath, *Scouts Out! The Development of Reconnaissance Units in Modern Armies* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 199.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Counterinsurgency is an intelligence driven operation and intelligence is produced from information.¹ Scout platoons are an information gathering asset within a brigade that collect information by conducting reconnaissance and security operations. As the environment changes the scout platoon, adapts the ways it conducts reconnaissance and security operations to collect relevant information for the commander. Connected to this concept is training. U.S. Army units train to prepare themselves for combat operations. Therefore, scout platoons adapt their training to ensure they are fulfilling the information requirements of the commander for the most likely operational environment they will operate. Since the U.S. Army is most likely to operate in an insurgency, it is important that scout platoons get training right for this environment. This chapter outlines the research methodology taken to answer the question: What training is required to prepare a cavalry scout platoon to provide information in an insurgency?

There are three aspects to the topic question: the scout platoon, insurgency as an operational environment, and training. Exploring these aspects individually answers the question, what training is required to prepare a cavalry scout platoon to provide information in an insurgency? The first aspect is the the scout platoon. Addressing the question, how does the scout platoon operate, highlights this variable. The next aspect is the operational environment of insurgency. Asking the question, what is unique about the operational environment in insurgency and how does it affect the scout platoon, addresses this aspect. The final aspect is training. Exploring the question, what is unique about training to operate in an insurgency, addresses this aspect.

To research these topics, this study requires the use of oral history interviews. These interviews use the oral history methodology. They are voluntary and the interviewees consent to using the information gained in the process for this research. This study conducts the interviews using electronic mail individually to five former scout platoon leaders in February and March 2010. The interviewee's identities are not revealed, however, the notes of these interviews are included as Appendix A. The interviews explore the thoughts of five former scout platoon leaders who conducted operations against an insurgency and fill the void identified in the available literature.

U.S. Army doctrine and experience provides insight into the question: "How does the reconnaissance platoon operate?" Doctrine provides tenets for how the platoon gathers information. The interviews provide specific examples of the implementation of this doctrine. These examples provide a baseline experience set that then can be analyzed.

Researching pertinent writings on the operational environment and doctrine addresses the question: "What is unique about operational environment in the insurgency band and how does it affect the scout platoon?" U.S. Army doctrine frames the insurgency band in FM 3-0, *Operations* and FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. This information is derived from many of the expert thinkers on the subject. FM 3-90.28, *Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon*, depicts the unique aspects of the insurgency environment as it pertains to the scout platoon.

Reviewing doctrine and applying experience and the influence of the operational environment addresses the question: "what is unique about training to operate in an insurgency?" To corroborate doctrine, this study explores the thoughts of five former scout platoon leaders. In particular, it uses the interviews to address whether current

training is sufficient to prepare platoons for operations. Although the interview data is anecdotal, it captures the aspects of training for an insurgency from the scout platoon perspective filling a void identified in the literature review.

Analysis is the next step. By following the methodology depicted, the answers to the questions and their analysis become the source for the next chapter. Ultimately, this methodology answers the question: What training is required to prepare a cavalry scout platoon to provide information in an insurgency?

¹US, Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 2006), 3-1.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The scout platoon is one of the brigade's information collectors. Trained to collect and fight for information, if necessary, it plays an important role in full spectrum operations. As the paradigm of warfare shifts from gathering information about enemy systems, as in general war, to gathering information about a population, as in insurgency, the scout platoon adapts.¹ This chapter analyzes the uniqueness of the scout platoon; the trends that shape insurgency as an operating environment; and the tasks, conditions and standards required to train the scout platoon for this environment.

Analysis of the Scout Platoon

Gathering information relevant to the commander is the scout platoon's purpose. The first sentence of the scout platoon manual, FM 3-20.98 *Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon*, states, "In simplest terms, reconnaissance and scout platoons serve as the commander's eyes and ears in the area of operations (AO)."² The scout platoon does this through reconnaissance and security missions, which are integral tactical enabling missions that are conducted as part of full spectrum operations.

Reconnaissance operations are conducted to acquire information for the commander about the terrain, weather, enemy or civilian population within the commander's operational environment.³ These operations take the form of route, area, or zone reconnaissance and enable other tactical operations, particularly offense, defense, and stability or civil support. A route reconnaissance focuses on a prescribed route and the areas that influence that route. An area reconnaissance focuses on a specified area. A

zone reconnaissance focuses on a broader area known as a zone. Because each of these missions is time consuming, the commander is encouraged to focus his platoon on the information he needs through his reconnaissance guidance.⁴ Surveillance, or observing from a fixed location over a period of time, is an integral part of both reconnaissance and security missions.

Security operations provide “early and accurate warning of enemy operations.”⁵ These operations generally focus on an enemy force and are most often fixed. Scout platoons provide security by conducting either a screen, or providing local or area security. All of these missions are defensive in nature and focus on providing information about the enemy in order to allow the commander time to react. In all security cases the platoon may be required to repel enemy forces within its capability.

“Counterinsurgency is an intelligence driven endeavor.”⁶ Because the operational environment is so dynamic in counterinsurgency and the focus is on the population, information gathering assets like the scout platoon no longer focus reconnaissance and security missions on gathering information on the enemy. Scout platoons refer to this as multi-dimensional reconnaissance which is defined by FM 3-90.28 *Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon* as, “the directed effort to obtain detailed information covering all types of threat forces (military, paramilitary, criminal, and other), civilian demographics (social/human), infrastructure (including utilities, transportation, and the political, economic, and agricultural situation), routes, obstacles, and terrain.”⁷ The key here is the addition of population aspects such as civilian demographics and infrastructure.

As counterinsurgents, the scout platoon must be able to focus its reconnaissance and security efforts on multi-dimensional information. To do this the platoon focuses on

people, conducting tactical questioning intended to collect specific information. The platoon, also, integrates technology such as biometrics equipment, and the Tactical Ground Reporting Network (TiGRNET) database to collate information and plan for operations. To assist in multi-dimensional reconnaissance, the platoon leverages special teams such as Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) Teams, Human Intelligence Collection Teams (HCTs), Civil Affairs (CA) Teams and even Chemical Reconnaissance Teams to assist in collecting information such as civilian demographics, civilian atmospherics, or infrastructure status.

Leaders plan and lead these operations. They plan human collection and develop the tactical plan to support the collection plan. Scout leaders analyze the information they receive identifying trends and leverage technology, like TiGRNET, to organize and disseminate this information. Scout leaders request and plan for the integration of specialized teams to assist their efforts. Finally, scout leaders master culture ensuring operations are planned with this variable at the forefront and that information is analyzed from a cultural perspective.

The individuals of the platoon are paramount to the platoon's efforts in conducting multi-dimensional reconnaissance. Culturally astute and tactically proficient individuals serve as sensors for the platoon collecting the information required. They interact with civilians collecting information in an inoffensive manner due to their cultural training. To do this scouts are proficient in the use of an interpreter. They are also tactically proficient with the ability to engage lethally if threatened.

In counterinsurgency, the scout platoon focuses on collecting multi-dimensional information from the population. This information is then used to drive operations and

inform an overall plan that defeats the insurgent by winning over the population. This is not its only focus; however, as the trends in the operational environment require the platoon to focus on operations that mitigate both the causes of the insurgency and the methods the insurgent uses.

Analysis of Insurgency and the Operating Environment

FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, defines insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”⁸ An insurgent uses the operational environment to recruit the population to his cause. In order to gain support and in some respect legitimacy, insurgents use terrorist or guerrilla tactics to their advantage against the nation they are trying to usurp. By extension if a U.S. force is assisting the counterinsurgent, then the insurgent uses these tactics against the U.S. force. The information environment is critical in counterinsurgency. Because an insurgency is about political power and not military capability, it is imperative to identify information on both the insurgent and the people. The focus of both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent is therefore the population and not each other.⁹

Globalization, demographic changes, urbanization, climate change and natural disasters, and failed and failing states are all causes for an insurgency. Technology, resource demand, and weapons of mass destruction are all means used or sought by insurgents. Important to this study is how these trends effect the scout platoon by affecting the operational environment.

Globalization is an economic based trend. It causes conflict through an increase in nationalism and can also cause conflict by leading to insurgency.¹⁰ Its focus on the

disparity between impoverished people and a small upper class causes insurgency. To address economic disparity as a root cause, the counterinsurgent needs to address economic development.¹¹ First however the counterinsurgent needs to understand the economic situation. During counterinsurgency the scout platoon acquires information on the economic situation in its area.¹² The scout platoon seeks to understand how the population buys and sells goods and what goods are produced and exported by conducting reconnaissance and security missions focused on markets and the economy. Individual scouts observe markets and interact with businesses to gain information important to the commander's assessment of the situation. Scout leaders plan these operations and seek to understand markets and identify new economic projects that will decrease economic disparity.

Demographic changes are another cause of an insurgency. They challenge a government by creating a large population or a growth spike in a population that is too cumbersome for the government to support.¹³ To combat this, the counterinsurgent must understand the population's demographics and how they are affecting the legitimate government's ability to govern. In support of this, scout platoons collect information on civilian demographics.¹⁴ The subsequent reconnaissance operations then take-on a census-like approach collecting pertinent information on persons in its area, such as numbers of people per household, age, marital status, employment status, and schooling. To conduct these operations, scout leaders build and fill out reports that facilitate demographics collection. Individual scouts then conduct patrols recording demographic information from the population and reporting this information in the form of debriefs.

Urbanization can also cause insurgency. It creates an environment where the concentration and requirements of the population overwhelm government. Combating this cause combines addressing the cause of the insurgency, whether it is security, essential services, economics, or governance, coupled with dealing with the asymmetric advantage the urban environment gives the insurgent. The scout platoon supports this by collecting information from the population that informs the cause of the insurgency and collecting information on the insurgent itself all while mitigating the risk of operating in an urban environment. To collect information from the population, the scout platoon must either work with the indigenous security force to provide security or secure the population itself in order to gain the population's trust. Once it gains the trust of the population it will begin receiving information on the population's needs and on the insurgency. As these needs are addressed the scout platoon collects information on whether the insurgent is separating from the population and therefore its source of power.

To mitigate the complexity of urban terrain the scout platoon must understand how to operate among man-made structures and a dense population.¹⁵ Appendix C in FM 3-20.98, *Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon* covers these operations in detail. It requires individual scouts to be proficient at urban battle drills. Key to operating among man-made structures is a proficiency in the use of imagery. Scout leaders must understand how to get and use imagery products and technology to facilitate their planning and their platoon's operations. Leaders must also be aware of the capabilities of enablers like HCTs and understand how to request and integrate them for urban operations.

Trends in climate change and natural disasters can also cause insurgency. Climate change primarily creates urbanization and resource demand.¹⁶ Natural disasters, however,

often lead to stability or civil security tasks where the U.S. must be aware of the possibility of an insurgency. To prevent this, scout platoons focus on providing information that supports stability tasks. This consists of polling the population to determine what emergency resources are needed, conducting reconnaissance of terrain to identify distribution points, conducting reconnaissance to assess damage, and collecting information on criminal activity. If an insurgency takes hold, scout platoons shift their focus to collecting on insurgents and their activity. Scout leaders are aware of indicators for insurgency and organized crime and integrate them into their plans. Individual scouts then securely use interpreters to gather information on these indicators from the population.

Failed or failing states represent the final trend that causes insurgency. Because governments are unable to adapt to the challenges of providing for their populace, they come into competition with other groups vying for power within their borders. In short, insurgency works in failed and failing states.¹⁷ To combat this, scout platoons gather information on what is causing the state to fail, gather information on groups that are competing with the state, and support the state's security infrastructure. Scout platoons focus on gathering information that will assist the commander in deciding how to legitimize the state in the minds of its population. This information is gathered from the population and relies on the same tenets as some of the other trends. Often times a nation's security infrastructure is what is allowing the insurgency to gain a foothold and creating the failing state. The scout platoon may focus on assessing security forces and training them to combat an insurgency. Scout leaders analyze the assessment data and develop and implement training plans to improve host nation security force capability.

Scouts then train security forces in accordance with this plan. In these operations the platoon trains security forces to gather information from their population, ensures they abide by the rule of law, and empowers them to succeed by providing more legitimacy and mentorship.

While addressing the cause of the insurgency, scout platoons must also address the means of the insurgency. This is done by targeting the insurgent and how he fights. The goal in this action is not to kill all of the insurgents but rather to mitigate his influence on the people. By using this approach, U.S. Army units and by extension scout platoon starve the insurgent from his support, the people. This means the platoon must gather information on technology, resource demand, and weapons of mass destruction.

Technology gives power to groups through the ability to communicate their message and network together, and through the ability to fight. For example, the same technology that allows U.S. forces to pilot an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) over Iraq from Law Vegas also allows terrorist networks to collaborate for and execute an upcoming attack.¹⁸ The scout platoon focuses on technology by supporting information operations and through collecting technical information on the methods an insurgent uses to fight. This technical information includes proactively collecting biometric data from the population, identifying threat weapon systems and locations where they are hidden, identifying communications capabilities, and tactical site exploitation to collect evidence. In insurgency, scouts collect information much like crime scene analysts do and feed this information not just to their higher headquarters but ultimately to combined organizations such as the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell (CEXC), and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). To collect this information, individual

scouts are skilled in evidence collection and use technology such as biometrics equipment to assist in this process. In order to feed this information to higher organizations, scout leaders understand how to use technology and leverage these resources. To assist in detailed evidence collection, scout leaders also request and plan to integrate Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) teams, Military Police (MP) dog teams, and Weapon's Intelligence Teams (WIT).

Resource demand provides another way for insurgents to gain power over the population. If the insurgent controls the resources, then he can coerce the populations support. To combat this, the scout platoon collects information on limited resources to assist commanders in deciding what resources to protect. This begins with scout leaders developing collection plans that identify what resources are limited. This information is then used to identify vulnerabilities and to establish priorities for security forces. Scouts also collect on resources that are limited to the insurgency such as weapons and explosives. The commander can use this information to identify and exploit insurgent weaknesses creating time for other elements of the campaign to become effective.

Finally, insurgents seek to use weapons of mass destruction to gain power over the population. These weapons create fear in a population and coerce the population to support the insurgency. To combat this, scout platoons conduct reconnaissance and security operations focused on weapons of mass destruction. Although these operations are usually reserved for specialized units, scout platoons integrate enablers and seek information from civilians when tasked with these missions. Scout leaders plan for and request specialized teams, like chemical reconnaissance teams. Individual scouts have the

additional requirement to identify the effects of weapons of mass destruction during these operations.

The operational environment is complex with trends either providing a cause for insurgents or providing a means for insurgents. The scout platoon operates in this environment by collecting information primarily from people and maximizing its capability and the capability of other enablers. Because, the platoon provides information for the commander across this varied environment, the platoon understands and trains for the environment's effects. The next section discusses the training doctrine of FM 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, and the tasks contained in STPs, CATs, and POI.

Analysis of Training

Army training as outlined in FM 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, “is a system of techniques and standards that allows Soldiers and units to determine, acquire, and practice necessary skills.”¹⁹ It builds unit confidence and agility and prepares Soldiers for the rigors of combat.²⁰ Training is conducted in the Institutional, Operational and Self-Development domains.²¹ The institutional domain is categorized as taking place at the Army's many schools and centers. It is individual training targeted at giving the Soldier the skills necessary to become a contributing member of a team in the operational domain.²² The operational domain is comprised of training conducted in the Army's operational units. It focuses on individual and collective tasks that support the operational unit's essential tasks.²³

The Army trains using live, virtual, constructive, and gaming training enablers. Live training is executed in field conditions using the equipment the Soldier would use in combat.²⁴ Virtual training uses computers to generate battlefields and employs realistic

simulators which Soldiers use to fight in these battlefields.²⁵ Constructive training exercises command and control using computer simulations to create inputs.²⁶ Finally, gaming uses civilian off-the-shelf games to support training.²⁷

The Army trains its forces through a series of tasks. These tasks are derived from the capabilities that the Joint Force requires from the Army to successfully achieve the Joint Force commander's end state.²⁸ The capability required from the Army is broad and resources such as time are finite. Army commander's must use judgment when determining the tasks that their subordinate units will train on based on what their units are likely to do. Commanders exercise this judgment by focusing their organizations on mission-essential tasks.²⁹ Subordinate units then identify what tasks they must focus on that will support their higher headquarters mission essential tasks.³⁰ As this process continues, the scout platoon must be focused on the tasks it will be required to execute based on the operational environment it will be employed.

The U.S. Army has some basic principles for training. For example, FM 7-0 dictates that, "Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) train individuals, crews and small teams."³¹ Units implement these principles as they develop their training plans to train their individuals, leaders, and collective units as efficiently as possible. Individual training usually consists of a class or demonstration performed by a NCO followed by the individual performing that task. Leader training consists of leader professional development sessions, leader vignettes, leader training events, and other functions focused on the leader away from his Soldiers. Collective training then puts these skills together and gauges how the unit works as a team. The point is that training builds on

itself from the individual and leader level to the collective level, therefore, reinforcing each task as it builds.

Tasks for the scout platoon and its members are contained in different doctrinal publications. Individual tasks represent what that Soldier does as an individual that supports what the platoon is doing collectively. Soldier's manuals describe individual tasks for enlisted personnel and focus on four skill levels. Skill level 1 represents tasks that a Soldier of the rank of Private through Specialist would be required to conduct to support the platoon's collective task. Skill level two represents tasks required of a Sergeant. Skill level three represents tasks of a Staff Sergeant and skill level four of a Sergeant first class. Officer Foundations Standards record the tasks required for an officer; however, these have become dated. Therefore, to capture the tasks required of a Lieutenant, this study focuses on the program of instruction for the Armor Officer Basic Officer Leadership Course.

The individual tasks for the Scout Platoon encompass all the tasks a Soldier within the platoon may conduct. In theory, if an individual were proficient at all of his tasks then the platoon could be successful. However, this assumes that the task list is complete. With the shift to full spectrum operations this becomes difficult because the individual may be required to execute a task that is not on the list in order for the platoon to be successful. Additionally, if all of the tasks are captured for the individual, there is the possibility of the list overwhelming the time available to train.

CATS depict the collective tasks of the scout platoon. They can be found through the Army Training Network accessed through Army Knowledge Online and list the collective tasks required of the platoon to support the essential tasks of its higher

headquarters. Because the scout platoon is assigned to both the Cavalry Squadron of each type of brigade (IBCT, HBCT, and SBCT) along with each of the maneuver battalions within these brigades, there is a slight difference in the wording of each of these tasks with respect to the type of platoon. Like individual tasks, collective tasks face the same challenges with respect to the volume of tasks verse the time available to train them. In CATS case, doctrine has smartly broken these tasks into vague groups that can accommodate different techniques dependent on the environment. For example, the tasks group, “Perform Basic Tactical Tasks–Platoon” can accommodate change within the environment.³²

Finally, the scout platoon has tasks associated with its leadership. Although some may argue these tasks are codified in the lieutenant and sergeant through sergeant first class level tasks, this study represents these tasks by depicting the tasks trained at ARC. ARC’s purpose is to prepare Commissioned Officers and Noncommissioned Officers Staff Sergeant and above to perform as leaders of reconnaissance platoons in today's modular force and to meet the challenges of the future.”³³ ARC strives to remain relevant to the scouting force and therefore trains leader tasks that are relevant to the current operating environment. Because it too is limited in time, the leaders of ARC work with the operational Army to ensure they are training the right tasks.

Tasks are just one portion of training. Training also consists of conditions and standards. Conditions are where the operational environment ties to training. They consist of the environmental variables within which the platoon is required to execute the task. The basic variables of the conditions, things such as equipment needed, are outlined in the CATS.³⁴ However, because the conditions vary dependent on the part of the world the

platoon is operating, it is the commander's responsibility to, as FM 7-0 *Training for Full Spectrum Operations* states, "train as you will fight."³⁵ To do this the commander must mimic as realistically as possible the conditions that the platoon will face while deployed in combat.³⁶

Standards define whether the platoon has conducted a task correctly. They are broken down into measures and criterion. Measures define for the platoon whether they have properly completed a task. Criterion establishes a minimum for which the task is considered completed to standard. Criterion can be a quantitative measure such as time or it can be more qualitative such as completing tasks in order.³⁷ For example, the task, "Interview Civilians and Nongovernmental Officials (NGOs) for potential Intelligence Information," a scout skill level 1 task has the following standard: "Obtained information of potential intelligence value by interviewing civilians and NGOs. Recorded and reported all significant information relevant to current information requirements. Submitted your information to your platoon or section leader." The criterion for this task is whether the individual completed all of the steps and does not address the demeanor of the civilian or the quality of the information received.³⁸ If success is determined by the effects the scout has on the people, then the U.S. Army must develop standards to measure this effect.

It is important to note that the Army is shifting away from a sole focus on tasks, conditions and standards and toward a training paradigm that focuses on an overarching outcome. Outcomes based training focuses less on executing steps in order to achieve task completion and focuses more on initiative toward achieving the desired outcome.³⁹ The Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group continues to develop outcomes based training

in an effort to promote mission command and Soldier initiative. It establishes a focus on the outcome of training vice the training focusing on tasks.⁴⁰ In the case of the task to gather information from civilians, the outcome may be, scouts gather demographics information from civilians without offending them. The standard would then address the quality of information gained and the demeanor of the civilians once the mission was completed.

Some training resources have adapted an outcomes based model, while others remain task focused. This makes a comparison between the resources difficult. For example, the Armor BOLC POI lists only the tasks trained and is outcomes based, whereas the skill level one tasks from the STP focuses on tasks, conditions, and standards. In the end, outcomes based training is compatible with the current doctrine in FM 7-0 and describes a different paradigm to approach training.

The scout platoon uses the task, condition, and standard paradigm to prepare for operations. Because time is a limited resource, commanders focus the tasks of the platoon on the environment they will face. The doctrine supports the commander in this effort giving him the latitude to shape his training; yet, some scout platoon leaders describe trends that depict the challenges in training for insurgency.

The interviews conducted for this thesis highlights some of these training trends (see Appendix A). In preparing for deployment, the majority of the former platoon leaders indicate they conducted live-fire training. This is done to ensure scouts are able to secure themselves regardless of their other role on the battlefield. The former platoon leaders describe this training as both weapon system qualifications and situational live-fire exercises.⁴¹

The former leaders note that their training lacked focus on dismounted operations and interaction with a population. This prevented them from interacting with the population and was ultimately a skill they learned while deployed through trial and error. They also indicate that they could have used more language training and more government and culture training both of which would have supported their operations amongst the populace.⁴²

Doctrine provides a comprehensive list of tasks to be trained at the individual, leader and collective level. It, also, provides a framework to train these effectively. The crux of the issue becomes the organization of the tasks the platoon is expected to execute, the platoon being resourced with a population to train these tasks as part of the conditions and establishing population centric standards to measure task achievement.

Although the task list for the scout platoon is comprehensive, it lacks organization which creates a challenge when determining which tasks to train. Currently tasks are major combat operations focused and it appears that the insurgency tasks were simply added with little thought as to what should be consolidated or deleted. Few tasks focus on gathering information from the population, yet scout platoon leaders who have operated in Iraq and Afghanistan state this is exactly what is happening. For example, of the 21 subject areas that include tasks for a skill level one cavalry scout, there is one task oriented at gathering information from the population. The subject area is subject area four and the task is, “Interview Civilians and Nongovernmental Officials for potential intelligence information (see table 1).”⁴³ Incidentally this is the only task of all the other enlisted skill level tasks found in the STPs that involves gathering information from the population.

Tasks for the scout platoon need to be expanded to capture the tasks being performed in insurgency. For example, the individual skill level one task, “Interview Civilians and NGOs for potential intelligence information,” is not replicated in any of the higher level enlisted skill level tasks. In fact, it is not referenced again until the leader tasks of, “Question Source for Intelligence Information,” and “Conduct Liaison with Local Civilians, Law Enforcement Officials, and Foreign Military Leadership.”⁴⁴ At a minimum planning and preparing for an engagement with a civilian or nongovernmental official should be added as a skill level two task to facilitate the skill level one task.⁴⁵ The point is there are 204 other tasks leaders train, most of which are focused on operating a weapons system to destroy an enemy. In the insurgency environment, the ability to collect information from the population is as important as the ability to operate a weapon system; therefore, the tasks should be relooked to achieve more balance.⁴⁶ To assist this effort, part of the solution may be to implement a more outcomes based methodology.

For commanders to resource the platoon to train for insurgency, they must establish the right conditions. When training for major combat, the commander resources an opposing force (OPFOR) and ensures they understand his intent for training and are prepared to facilitate the training. In insurgency, the scout platoon needs a trained cadre to simulate a foreign population and this cadre must be prepared in the same manner. This cadre should be versed in all of the aspects of the society it is portraying and must understand and be able to mimic the actions of the civilians with respect to the actions of the platoon.

Currently this is done in the live environment in two ways. The first method is to hire actual civilians to mimic a population. The second is to use Soldiers to do this.

Hiring civilians is the best way because it can provide people from the actual area the platoon will be operating. Because they are civilians, this population is more realistic and is unbiased with respect to training as a Soldier. This method is also more expensive. Using Soldiers is sufficient; however, Soldiers must be trained to act as civilians. Time and other resources must be devoted to these Soldiers to ensure they can role-play and think like the population with which the scout platoon is training to interact.

Another possibility is to use scouts to collect information from a population center at home station. Although, there are legal issues and other risks associated with this method, it is a cheap way for scouts to hone their skills in operating amongst a population.⁴⁷ For example, to gather economic information a scout platoon could be deployed to a farmer's market and tasked to collect information on the types of vegetables being sold, the cost of these vegetables, and the locations where they were grown. The scout leaders would then develop a tactical plan to patrol the market and a collection plan to gather the pertinent data. Once complete the scout platoon could use TiGRNET to input the information and analyze the data.

All of these population training options are feasible; however, they still do not provide an enduring capability, nor do they provide the flexibility to deal with changes in civilian support and more importantly budget. A more enduring way to deal with the need to provide civilians as training aids is to integrate a civilian training team into the Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS) facilities found at each U.S. Army garrison. Integrating a small team of civilians (two to three) who would have the responsibility to provide a trained population for live training whether it is contracting

actual civilians or training Soldiers to fill this role is the most efficient way to produce this capability.

The virtual, constructive, and gaming environments also need to account for populations. Currently, the Army has a suite of training devices that can focus on major combat operations such as the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) and the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST). As the focus shifts to include population, the Army must harness technology that will conserve resources. Since, live training with populations adds another resource; the U.S. Army must look for ways to leverage technology in the form of virtual, constructive and gaming to train scouts to interact with people. For example, gaming technology using the Darwars Ambush program is used in ARC to facilitate student training in area reconnaissance.⁴⁸ Also, the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is developing ways to use avatars in a virtual training environment through initiatives like Ground School XXI.⁴⁹ This technique shows promise for first responders and could provide a cheaper outlet for scouts to interact with people. For example, the virtual simulation Second Life already hosts a virtual world known as Wolfes Pond where first responders can respond to all types of emergencies using avatars in a virtual environment.⁵⁰

The scout platoon could utilize this program in a similar way as first responders, but focused on gathering information. For example, scout leaders could develop a collection plan focused on resources and execute that plan using avatars in Second Life. Individual scouts would maneuver their avatars in the virtual environment seeking the information desired and then report that information back to their leaders. This training is

cost effective while giving scouts the chance to interact with other people in a virtual world.

The scout platoon is an organization capable of operating in the insurgency band of the spectrum. The U.S. Army's training doctrine is organized to prepare Army units for the rigors of combat in any operational environment. In the final chapter of this thesis the focus will be on putting this information together to show how the reconnaissance squadron prepares the scout platoon for the operational environment of insurgency and the recommendations that need to be implemented to facilitate this training.

¹US, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 3-1.

²US, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-20.98, *Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 1-1.

³Ibid., 3-1.

⁴Ibid., 3-45 - 3-74.

⁵Ibid., 4-1.

⁶Ibid, 3-1.

⁷Ibid., 3-36.

⁸Ibid., 1-1.

⁹Ibid., 3-1.

¹⁰Fareed Zakaria, *The Post American World* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2008), 32-33.

¹¹US, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 5-16 – 5-17.

¹²US, Department of the Army, FM 3-20.98, 3-8.

¹³National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), vii.

¹⁴US, Department of the Army, FM 3-20.98, 3-36.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, C-1.

¹⁶US, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1-3.

¹⁷Robert H. Scales, *The Past is Prologue: Future Warfare through the Lens of Contemporary Conflicts* (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, 2009), 11.

¹⁸Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat* (New York: Picador, 2007), 39.

¹⁹US, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1-5.

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹*Ibid.*, 3-5.

²²*Ibid.*, 3-3.

²³*Ibid.*, 3-3.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 4-20.

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶*Ibid.*, 4-21.

²⁷*Ibid.*

²⁸*Ibid.*, 4-6 – 4-7.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 4-6.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 4-10.

³¹*Ibid.*, 2-1.

³²US Army Armor Center, “Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) Executive Summary Reconnaissance Squadron, Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) (AC)” (Fort Knox, KY: Government Printing Office, 2009), 184

³³US Army Armor Center, “Army Reconnaissance Course Program of Instruction (ARC POI)” (Fort Knox, KY: Government Printing Office, 13 March 2009), 2-1.

³⁴US, Department of the Army, FM 7-0, 4-17 – 4-18.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 2-5 – 2-6.

³⁶*Ibid.*, 2-6.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 4-17 – 4-18.

³⁸US, Department of the Army, Soldier Training Publication (STP) 17-19D1-SM, *Soldiers Manual Cavalry Scout MOS 19D Skill Level 1* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 2-122 – 2-123.

³⁹US, Department of the Army, Call Bulletin 09-40, *Nightmare in Training Area 15* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Government Printing Office, June 2009), 12.

⁴⁰Asymmetric Warfare Group, “Outcomes Based Training and Education (OBT&E): An Introduction to the Idea,” *AWG Net*: https://portal.awg.army.mil/portal/server.pt/search?in_hi_opt_comm_community=446&in_se_sel_1=everything&q=outcomes+based (accessed 7 April 2010).

⁴¹Scout platoon leader interviews conducted by the author via electronic mail from February to March 2010.

⁴²*Ibid.*

⁴³US, Department of the Army, Soldier Training Publication (STP) 17-19D1-SM, 2-122 – 2-123.

⁴⁴Headquarters, US Army Armor Center, “Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course Program of Instruction (AR BOLC POI)” (Fort Knox, KY: Government Printing Office, June 10, 2008), 7-9.

⁴⁵This task set is one example of task disparity and to recommend a specific and completely new task list is beyond the scope of this study. TRADOC periodically reviews tasks and should consider ensuring all tasks are nested and balanced in its next review or shift completely to an outcomes based training strategy redefining and nesting all tasks in this manner.

⁴⁶Because of the sheer number of tasks, individual, leader, and collective, balancing them requires a board that consists of representatives from the operational and institutional Army. These boards are convened periodically by the branch proponent which in this case is Armor branch.

⁴⁷The legal constraints and risks to this type of training differ from location to location. The unit’s legal advisor, as well as, its chain of command should be consulted before gathering information from US civilians. Furthermore, the battalion and brigade S2 can be consulted for more information on human collection.

⁴⁸US Army Armor Center, “Army Reconnaissance Course Program of Instruction (ARC POI),” 4-18.

⁴⁹Headquarters, US Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, “Ground School XXI Homepage” <https://www.benning.army.mil/groundschoollxxi/> (accessed 20 May 2010).

⁵⁰Linden Research Incorporated, “Wolfes Pond Police, Fire, and Rescue Role Play,” <http://world.secondlife.com/place/01dfd8ce-1340-cbc6-cbaf-748bfd11d2bf> (accessed 20 May 2010).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Whether, conducting offensive, defensive, or stability operations, an Army unit must assess a complex environment and determine what effect it desires to have on it. Since the development of Active Defense Doctrine in the 1970s, the Army developed doctrine that focused on the Soviet Union as the enemy.¹ This doctrine created an Army that was very effective at major combat operations but lacked training in other phases of the spectrum. To adapt to this shortcoming and provide more capability to our nation's leaders, the Army developed the doctrine of Full Spectrum Operations. It further focused itself on insurgency to prepare its leaders and Soldiers for the operations it would likely execute in the future. The challenge now lies in implementing this shift. To investigate the implementation of training doctrine, the scout platoon is examined. This chapter explores the conclusions from this study.

How to Train a Scout Platoon for Insurgency

The discussion of the operational environment and the trends that either lead to insurgency or are means of an insurgency provides insight into where the training of the scout platoon should be focused (see table 1). These focus areas give the scout platoon and the leaders who train it insight into what the platoon should do to prepare in a resource constrained environment. In order to succeed in counterinsurgency, the scout platoon must hone its skills at the individual, leader and collective levels in gathering information on and from people. The logical question that follows is how to train these skills.

Table 1. Scout Training based on Global Trends

	Individual	Leader	Collective
Globalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understand culture • Utilize an interpreter • Gather information from people • Conduct local security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Master Culture • Plan human collection • Develop a tactical plan • Analyze information • Understand markets • Identify new economic projects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operate among the population • Conduct reconnaissance and security focused on markets and economy
Technology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understand culture • Utilize an interpreter • Gather information from people • Conduct local security • Identify weapons and explosive devices (improvised and manufactured) • Collect evidence • Use technology (Biometrics, etc.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Master Culture • Plan human collection • Develop a tactical plan • Analyze information • Plan evidence collection (tactical site exploitation) • Identify trends in weapons and explosives use (improvised and manufactured) • Use technology (TiGRNET, etc.) • Leverage resources (JIEDDO, CEXC, etc.) • Plan for and request specialized teams (EOD, Weapons Intelligence, PSYOPs teams, etc.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operate among the population • Integrate technology into operations • Integrate specialized teams into operations • Conduct reconnaissance, security and tactical site exploitation focused on insurgent weapons, explosives, and communications capabilities
Demographic Changes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understand culture • Utilize an interpreter • Gather information from people • Conduct local security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Master Culture • Plan human collection • Develop a tactical plan • Analyze information • Build census reports that facilitate demographics collection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operate among the population • Conduct reconnaissance and security focused on gathering census information from the population
Urbanization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understand culture • Utilize an interpreter • Gather information from people • Conduct local security • Conduct urban battle drills 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Master Culture • Plan human collection • Develop a tactical plan • Analyze information • Plan urban operations • Use technology (imagery, TiGRNET, etc.) • Plan for and request specialized teams (CA teams, HCT, etc.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operate among the population • Integrate technology into operations • Integrate specialized teams into operations • Conduct urban reconnaissance and security focused both the cause of the insurgency and the insurgent
Resource Demand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understand culture • Utilize an interpreter • Gather information from people • Conduct local security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Master Culture • Plan human collection • Develop a tactical plan • Analyze information • Identify limited resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operate among the population • Conduct reconnaissance focused on terrain, resources, essential services, and security posture
Climate Change and Natural Disasters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understand culture • Utilize an interpreter • Gather information from people • Conduct local security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Master Culture • Plan human collection • Develop a tactical plan • Analyze information • Identify signs of insurgency and organized crime 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operate among the population • Conduct reconnaissance and security focused on facilitating stability operations • Conduct reconnaissance and security focused on identify insurgents and organized crime
Proliferation of WMD and their effects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understand culture • Utilize an interpreter • Gather information from people • Conduct local security • Identify effects of WMD use 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Master Culture • Plan human collection • Develop a tactical plan • Analyze information • Plan for and request specialized teams (Chemical Reconnaissance) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operate among the population • Integrate specialized teams into operations • Conduct reconnaissance and security focused on WMD
Failed and Failing States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understand culture • Utilize an interpreter • Gather information from people • Conduct local security • Train local security forces 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Master Culture • Plan human collection • Develop a tactical plan • Analyze information • Develop and implement a host nation security force training plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operate among the population • Conduct reconnaissance and security in support of the host nation and its security forces • Train and mentor host nation security forces

Source: Created by author.

At the individual level, the scout needs to be comfortable interacting with people. Understanding culture and language facilitate this and the reconnaissance squadron should place a high priority on scouts receiving this training. Scouts must understand the nuances of the culture to include factors that affect the operational variables of: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time.² Scouts must also have a basic knowledge of language and be able to interact with a person from another culture.

Currently, The U.S. Army uses different techniques to train culture. These include bringing subject matter experts and language instructors to Army posts to conduct instruction and sending Soldiers to the Defense Language Institute (DLI) for comprehensive language training. All of these programs have shown success in differing degrees. For scouts, individuals should receive basic classroom instruction and learn basic phrases. This should include at a minimum things that are offensive in that particular culture, for example showing a person the soles of your feet in an Arab culture, and phrases such as “hello,” “how are you,” “please and thank you” and “my name is”. These phrases serve as icebreakers and have a tendency to put civilians at ease. They are effective if used prior to resorting to the use of an interpreter. For local security purposes, scouts should also be taught basic commands such as “stop,” “drop your weapon,” and “put your hands up”. This training should be conducted daily if possible using the products provided by the DLI. Scouts can augment their individual training by using programs such as Rosetta Stone. This training needs to be reinforced at every training event, individual through collective, to ensure each scout gets maximum repetitions. The desired end state is that each scout is comfortable operating in that culture.

Once a scout understands culture, he should move on to understanding how to operate with an interpreter.³ Since it is unlikely U.S. Soldiers will master the language of the people they are going to interact with, the interpreter becomes a key enabler. This training should consist of classroom training on the basics of using an interpreter, such as speaking in short bursts and interpreter placement. This training should then be replicated in a practical exercise where the scout executes an engagement using an interpreter and then is critiqued by another scout. As in culture training, interpreter training must then be reinforced throughout every individual and collective training event to maximize repetitions. The goal of interpreter training is that each scout is comfortable using an interpreter to converse with indigenous people.

With the groundwork laid for interacting with indigenous civilians through culture and interpreter training, the next step is to train gathering information from civilians. The individual scout trains this by executing a population engagement. In this training, other scouts role-play the civilians. Prior to the engagement the scout is told what information to collect, for example the number of people, their age, and their sex in a particular household. The scout then uses his culture and interpreter training to talk to the head of the household and collects this information. Following the engagement, another scout and the head of the household conduct an after action review of the engagement discussing what went well and what could be improved. Following a successful engagement, the training could progressively increase in difficulty. For example, the head of the household could be combative or refuse to give the information challenging the scout to interact with him without alienating him further. As in the other tasks this individual task should be reinforced in the platoon collective training events. The goal of individual

engagement training is for the individual to understand how to gather information from people.

Of course not all scouts can be engaging the population simultaneously. Because of the presence of insurgents, some individuals must provide security for the population engagement; therefore, scouts need to be proficient in all of the weapons and equipment at their disposal. The scout gains proficiency with his weapons initially through qualification. He then builds confidence and increased expertise through realistic live-fire training which should include collective training at the buddy team, dismount patrol, and platoon level. Because a scout is likely to engage from both mounted platforms and dismounted, the individual scout should be given the opportunity to train and qualify on both types of weapons. This training increases the confidence of the individual in himself and in the other members of his platoon. If the scout is confident he can fight then the scout will be more comfortable working among the population. The goal of this training is that each scout can operate the weapons of the platoon as an individual and as part of a team effectively thus securing the platoon.

Because insurgencies use technology asymmetrically, the individual scout must understand how to identify weapons and explosives, how to collect evidence, and how to use technology. The scout trains identification of weapons and explosives by using products provided from subject matter experts such as the intelligence community, JIEDDO, and CEXC. These products are acquired from open source intelligence, like Jane's Defense, and through the chain of command. They are updated periodically because of variations in enemy tactics. Scouts learn how to collect evidence by receiving training from a subject matter expert, usually a military policeman, and then conducting

evidence collection in a training environment. Finally, scouts train on using technology, such as the biometrics collection device known as the Biometrics Automated Toolset (BATs) through subject matter experts followed by practical exercises. In the event subject matter experts are unavailable, scouts can usually utilize the equipments technical manual to learn how to operate the equipment. Generally, these tasks are trained using a demonstration and hands-on approach. As in the information gathering task, it is important to reinforce all of this training collectively. The goal is that the scout understands and can identify the various weapons and explosives that are being used in theater, the scout can collect evidence that will lead to prosecution of the perpetrator, and the scout can utilize any technology the platoon has at its disposal.

Because insurgencies are drawn to urban areas, scouts need to be comfortable fighting in an urban environment. For the individual scout this includes conducting urban battle drills. Scouts train these drills in urban training areas initially as individuals and then build to team and platoon training. At a minimum scouts should understand how to enter and clear a room, and how to move in an urban environment. If possible, these tasks are conducted in a live-fire scenario for added realism. Again, this training is lead by NCOs and follows the demonstration and hands on approach. The goal of this training is that scouts are comfortable operating and gathering information in an urban environment.

In the event that insurgents are seeking the power of weapons of mass destruction, the scout must be able to recognize the indicators of weapons of mass destruction. This includes the effects of these weapons on people who have come in contact with them. To train for this, scout platoons should leverage their chemical officers and receive classroom training reinforced by live training that simulates people who have been

exposed to these weapons. For example, scouts could interact with a shopkeeper and identify him as having symptoms of various weapons exposure to include chemical, nuclear, biological, and radiological weapons use. The goal of this training is that individual scouts could identify exposure and take individual protective measures.

The final individual task is training local security forces. Scouts must understand how to train security forces in order to increase their capability. Because the U.S. Army has inculcated a training mindset, this task comes naturally. To train this task, individual scouts are given basic instruction and then conduct live training. For example, if the scout is going to train rifle marksmanship to a security force, the scout is given basic instruction of rifle marksmanship and then introduced to an indigenous Soldier and instructed to train the Soldier. The scout then repeats the steps he was taught training the host nation Soldier on the task. As all these tasks training host nation security forces must be reinforced in collective training to maximize individual proficiency.

At the leader level, scouts need to master culture, understand how to plan human collection, develop tactical plans, and analyze information. Mastering culture implies a greater understanding than the individual scout. Scout leaders understand culture and why certain reactions are occurring to facilitate analysis and planning. To achieve mastery, scout leaders need to receive additional training above that of the individual scout. This training includes additional readings, specialized classes given by subject matter experts and leader forums that include exposure to culture and language. Leaders also make contact with units currently deployed through email and video teleconference (VTC) to increase both situational and cultural awareness. The goal of this training is to ensure

scout leaders can analyze information through a cultural lens and to facilitate scout planning from a cultural perspective.

Planning human collection and making a tactical plan are interconnected. Each plan has to support the other and relies on the troop leading procedures to develop each plan. To train these tasks, leaders can use a variety of methods, such as leader professional development, and leader specific training events. Developing these plans is also conducive to execution using virtual and gaming technology.⁴ For example, leaders can develop and execute their collection and tactical plans in a gaming environment using Darwars Ambush. What is important is that these methods do not have to involve troops. For example, leaders can be given a vignette and directed to develop a tactical and human collection plan that is then briefed to the other scout leaders. In turn, these leaders provide feedback to the briefer. As all of the individual training, producing human collection plans and tactical plans is reinforced in platoon collective training to increase proficiency. The goal of this training is that the scout leader can effectively plan for a civilian engagement and the human collection plan and the tactical plan are synchronized.

The scout leader must, also, be able to analyze information in order to identify gaps that require follow-on operations. This training integrates the troop leading procedures and focuses the leader on using his knowledge of the culture and the situation to determine what information needs to be gathered next. To train this leaders are required to build on the tactical and collection plans they initially developed based on the results of these missions. For example, after briefing a plan based on a vignette to his peers and receiving feedback, the scout leader is given a card depicting the information his unit gathered during that mission. The leader then produces a new tactical and

collection plan based on the gaps. The outcome is that the leader exercises initiative and develops collection and tactical plans based off the information he gained during the last patrol.

The leader also must possess specific skill sets that maximize the platoon's effectiveness dependent on the trend in the operating environment. For example to understand how globalization is affecting the population and causing insurgency, the scout leader must understand markets and be able to identify new economic projects. A method of training this is to take leaders to a flea market, touring the facilities and interacting with the vendors. The goal of this training is that the leader understands how a basic economic market operates. Each trend has identified additional leader tasks that require focus. Like the individual tasks, these tasks should therefore be trained at the leader level before moving on to collective training.

To understand trends in technology, scout leaders need to understand trends in weapons use. To train this, the squadron intelligence officer provides briefs on recent enemy techniques and their trends to the leaders of the platoon on a periodic basis with the target being monthly. The goal is that the leader has a better understanding of the threat and its vulnerabilities. The scout leader must also be proficient in using technology. Since this is a tangible task scout leaders attend periodic training using TiGRNET and other applicable systems. The goal is that leaders understand how to use these systems and can maximize their unit's effectiveness through their use. Leaders also need to leverage resources when dealing with technology. Enablers like JIEDDO and CEXC are available to train leaders in a classroom setting and can be coordinated through the platoon's higher headquarters. At a minimum, leaders need to understand the

capabilities of these enablers and how to gain access to their training products through the internet and classified channels. Leaders are also trained on enablers and their integration through capabilities briefings and interactive displays. This training is coordinated at the platoon's higher headquarters and provides leaders with the necessary expertise to plan for and request specialized teams such as EOD, WIT, and PSYOPs.

To understand demographics changes, the leader builds census reports that facilitate collection on demographics. Leaders train building these reports through vignettes and interaction with the squadron intelligence officer and CA teams. If available, anthropologists and human terrain teams also can facilitate this training. The goal for this training is that scout leaders understand how to format and collect this information.

To understand urbanization, the scout leader uses technology, such as TiGRNET, and specialized teams, like HCTs to facilitate its operations in these environments. This training is conducted in a similar manner as the training above. Scout leaders train TiGRNET by using this system periodically. They must also understand how to get access to imagery and other terrain products that assist in planning and executing urban operations. This training is done through coordination with the squadron intelligence officer and the brigades engineer assets. There are also numerous internet based and open source mapping products that can be used, such as Google maps and Falconview, the point is scout leaders become familiar with one or more of these and understand how to utilize them in an urban environment. The overall goal of this training is to ensure scout leaders understand what terrain products are available and how to request them.

Resource demand requires the leader to identify limited resources. To train this skill, leaders need to understand what resources are important and how they are supplied. A good way to understand resources like water and energy is to study the systems in the U.S. To do this, scout leaders conduct tours of local power, water, and sewage facilities and gain an understanding of how these resources work. Leaders also conduct forums where they gain an understanding of how these systems work in the environment they will operate. This is done through using subject matter experts like civil affairs teams, VTCs with deployed units, and internet resources. The goal of this training is that the scout leader can identify limited resources as well as the means to maintain and increase the supply of these resources.

Climate change requires the leader to identify signs of organized crime and insurgency. This is trained by interaction with local law enforcement. Through ride-alongs and briefings the scout leader gains an understanding of how gangs and organized crime operates. The goal of this training is that the leader sees firsthand the indicators of crime and insurgent-like activity and therefore better identifies it when deployed.

The trend in weapons of mass destruction requires the scout leader to plan for and request specialized support. This training is done in the same manner as request other specialized teams and can be conducted when individual scouts train identifying the effects of weapons of mass destruction. It requires coordination through the squadron chemical officer to the brigade's chemical platoon. The training consists of capability briefs from chemical platoon subject matter experts and includes a display of their equipment for familiarization. The goal of this training is that scout leaders understand how to plan for and request chemical reconnaissance support.

Finally, the trend of failed and failing states requires the leader to focus on training indigenous security forces by developing and implementing training plans. Because leaders receive this training as part of their professional schooling, leaders need only review how to train and apply the cultural nuances of the force to be trained to how they would train their own forces. A way to reinforce this training is to provide leaders with a vignette that includes an assessment of a host nation security force. The leader then develops and briefs his training plan based on this assessment receiving feedback from his fellow scout leaders. The goal is that leaders can develop and implement a training plan that increases the capability of host nation security forces.

As this training builds toward the platoon collectively, four trends become evident. The platoon must collectively train to operate among the population, integrate technology into the platoon's operations, integrate specialized teams into the platoon's operations, and conduct reconnaissance and security operations. To focus on these trends the platoon executes situational training lanes that focus on the trends pertinent to their operational environment. These lanes can be executed in a live or virtual environment and are resourced by the platoon's higher headquarters to ensure an adequate training population is available.⁵

For example if a platoon is going to be operating in an area heavily affected by globalization, demographic changes, and urbanization, then the platoon would conduct reconnaissance and security lanes focused on markets and economy; insurgent weapons, explosives, and communications capabilities, and gathering census information. While the platoon is conducting these lanes it will operate among a properly resourced population, integrate its technology, such as BATs, and integrate specialized teams, such

as an HCT. If time permits or the location of the platoon's deployment is unknown, all of the global trends should be considered when developing lanes. During these lanes it is imperative that the individual and leader tasks are reinforced to ensure maximum training value.

The scout platoon requires individual, leader and collective training that accounts for the insurgent environment and its trends. To implement and streamline this training the following recommendation requires consideration.

Recommended Changes to Training.

Based on the analysis and conclusions of this study, the scout platoon's training doctrine needs to update its task list and standards and the U.S. Army needs to resource TADSS with personnel who can provide civilians as training aids.

The scout platoon has a task list that appears to be the product of continued addition with little analysis into the tasks relevant to insurgency and little effort into consolidating the list of tasks. This study has depicted additional tasks for insurgency; however, understanding the task review process, it recommends that a panel conduct a holistic review of scout tasks. This panel should be drawn from both the institutional and operational Army and include both NCOs and officers. Since the scout platoon's proponent is the U.S. Army's Armor branch, the Armor branch chief should convene this panel. Recommended guidance to the panel should include creating a full spectrum task list that accounts for insurgency yet does not overwhelm the force with too many tasks.

The panel then needs to set out capturing all the tasks the platoon performs in insurgency. These tasks need to be added to tasks being performed in general war, unstable peace, and stable peace. Once all of the collective tasks are identified, they need

to be grouped with the goal of determining what tasks remain the same regardless of the environment. This collective task list then drives the development of the individual and leader task lists.

Individual and leader tasks should be nested with the collective tasks and each other. For example, the individual skill level one task focused on gathering information from the population, “Interview civilians and non-governmental civilians for potential intelligence information” would be replicated in skill levels two-four with tasks that account for these levels supervising and planning for the skill level one individual to conduct this task. To limit redundancy, individual and leader tasks need to be consolidated. For example, of the 204 leader tasks 122 of them are focused on operating a piece of equipment. If the Army consolidated all of these tasks under the heading, “Operate Platoon Equipment” and continued to ensure the operating procedures for each piece of equipment were resident in the equipments technical manual, the scout platoon would be less inundated with equipment oriented tasks. By reducing these tasks the scout will be able to focus on other aspects of the spectrum.

Next to facilitate training for insurgency, the standards associated with scout tasks need revision. In the case where the standard is whether the task is completed and does not assess the effectiveness of the task, the task needs to be rewritten. To use a doctrinal reference, standards need to look more like measures of effectiveness and less like measures of performance.⁶ These rewritten standards will take into account the effects the platoon had on the environment ensuring there were no unintended results. For example the standard, “Obtained information of potential intelligence value by interviewing civilians and NGOs, recorded and reported all significant information relevant to current

information requirements, and submitted your information to your platoon or section leader” could be rewritten to include the statement, “interacted with the population in manner that was not offensive to the person’s culture and did not create any negative perceptions.”⁷

Finally, the U.S. Army needs to address the capability gap in providing civilians for training. The best way to do this is to resource the TADSS directorate on each Army garrison with personnel who can facilitate this aspect of training. This requires two-three civilian personnel focused on providing trained populations either as part of a larger civilian contract or from Soldiers detailed to fulfill that role. The U.S. Army has similar civilians who facilitate range operations and as this study has shown population centric operations will be as important if not more important in the future. This importance dictates the U.S. Army developing this enduring capability.

Conclusion

This study concludes that with the change in the operational environment to insurgency the focus of operations shifts from the enemy to the population. People become the driving factor in U.S. Army operations. Therefore, the scout platoon must shift its focus to gathering information on and from the population. To do this the platoon must be adequately trained and the commander must resource the platoon with a population with which to train.

To train the scout platoon to gather information in insurgency, the platoon must understand how the environment effects its operations. Trends in the operational environment have refocused the platoon, its leaders, and its Soldiers on multi-dimensional reconnaissance, culture and language, training host nation security forces

and integration of technology and specialized teams. Although, some of the kinetic tasks associated with the insurgents' presence are still applicable, the platoon balances its training for these tasks with its ability to gather information from the populace and address their needs.

Scout platoon tasks, conditions and standards have adapted and its training doctrine must follow. A holistic review of scout tasks with the goal of producing a full spectrum task list needs to be conducted to account for this change. Furthermore, scout platoon training standards need to be adjusted to measure effectiveness and not task completion. This study provides numerous examples that can serve as a baseline for this effort.

Scout platoons play and will continue to play a vital role in operations in the insurgency band of the spectrum. As the Army focuses on this portion of the spectrum, it needs to understand how to prepare all of its organizations. Researching the scout platoon and how it prepares offers insights into preparing other organizations. Since the scout platoon collects information and counterinsurgencies value information, it stands to reason this platoon may serve as a model for other platoon types to emulate. Furthermore, counterinsurgency operations require units be able to gather information and act on this information at the tactical level. Designed to fight for information, scout platoons are one example of a unit trained and equipped to execute these operations. The population requirements for the conditions and standards of the platoon and the focus on the operational environments effects on information gathering are important in preparing the scout platoon and other organizations for the insurgency band of the spectrum.

¹Robert H. Scales Jr. *Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War*, reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H300 *Roots of Today's Operational Environment Book of Readings* (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, December 2009), H306B-318.

²US, Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM) 3-20.98, *Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 1-2.

³Interpreters are limited assets and it is unrealistic to think that every scout will have an interpreter. Because of this limitation, there is ongoing debate as to whether the individual Soldier is merely security for leader engagement. The other side of this argument is that every Soldier is a sensor and it is often the individual Soldier who is more talented at interacting with people. The author chose to echelon this task down to the lowest level giving the scout leader the capability to withhold the interpreter at his level or utilize an individual Soldiers talents and provide him the interpreter to use.

⁴The US Army is currently developing virtual and gaming technology and this resource is not yet available to all scout leaders.

⁵Author acknowledges the virtual capability does not exist but as indicated in chapter 4 is being developed and may be used in the future.

⁶US, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 6-2.

⁷US, Department of the Army, Soldier Training Publication (STP) 17-19D1-SM, *Soldiers Manual Cavalry Scout MOS 19D Skill Level 1* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 2-122 – 2-123.

GLOSSARY

Conditions. Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual is expected to operate and may affect performance.

Counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.

Information. In the context of the cognitive hierarchy, data that have been processed to provide further meaning.

Insurgency. An organized movement aimed at overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.

Intelligence. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.

Operational Environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.

Reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.

Standard. A quantitative or qualitative measure and criterion for specifying the levels of performance of a task.

Surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.

Task. A clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations.

APPENDIX A.

Interview Notes

What did your squadron do to train your scout platoon for Iraq / Afghanistan?

For Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), a series of Leadership Professional Development (LPD) sessions focused on COIN operations in OIF. Attended a Key Leader Engagement exercise with actual Iraqi citizens, and conducted a series of Situational Training Exercises (STX) which incorporated individual and collective tasks that were being executed in OIF. These training events allowed us to see what kinds of information we would potentially be required to collect and to determine the best methods for obtaining information for the Squadron Staff to analyze.

Tasks I remember training (2005-2006): Basic skills test, BRM, Known Distance (KD) range, Convoy Live Fire, Mounted Gunnery, Mounted/Dismounted Live Fire STX on rolling open terrain, Close Quarters Battle (CQB), Mounted/Dismounted Reconnaissance.

1-14 Cavalry (CAV) trained to deploy for Iraq by building training from individual to collective levels, and from core to deployment METL. In March 2008 training began in earnest with a Scout Stakes event in a woodland environment. It provided for two weeks of preparation training and a week of execution. This training focused on individual soldier skills much like the Expert Infantrymen's Badge (EIB), but with a scout focus. Soldiers conducted road marches, land navigation, stress shoot ranges, weapons proficiency and communications proficiency tests, first aid, etc. All tests from this event were designed to prepare soldiers for a team recon lane which was the capstone event.

After individual training was certified we conducted a week long section live fire exercise. The focus was to teach sections to gain and maintain contact, and break contact. Essentially it was a lot of dismounted bounding and maneuvering on an open range. Following this event, in Aug 08 we went to Yakima Training Center, conducted table 4 scout gunnery on the Strykers, and shoot house training from team to section level. The capstone of this training was a mounted/ dismounted platoon live fire designed to have platoons conduct a zone recon to find the Forward Edge of the Battlefield (FEBA), then retrograde from their positions while maintaining contact.

The platoon live fire was the capstone for our core METL training. After this the focus changed to deployment METL training focused on urban terrain.

We conducted another platoon training event at Lechi Town (similar to Zussman at Fort Knox). Focus was for platoons to conduct an area recon of an objective in an urban environment by attempting first stealthy means, and then forceful means if necessary. In doing so, the platoons would be drawn into the town in order to collect their intelligence, would make contact and have to destroy an enemy, then conduct site exploitation and continue to gather intelligence. This was the first exercise where the 35M HUMINT soldiers were truly able to bring their skill set to bear.

In December 2008 we conducted a Troop live fire at Yakima. The mission was a movement to contact or perhaps a really aggressive screen, two small villages were built on the range. The Troop would bound into contact with dismounts and vehicles in the open terrain, call for fire on stationary targets which our mortars would then fire, and dismount into the villages to clear buildings.

In January 2009 we conducted a spur ride focused on team leadership with an air assault mission and area recon of an objective as the capstone.

We conducted one more Troop live fire event in Mar 09. It was similar to the first, but incorporated a Scout Weapons Team into the live fire event.

We then completed our NTC rotation and deployed shortly thereafter in August 2009.

In addition to squadron planned training Troops conducted numerous ranges. Most ranges were focused on preparing soldiers to fire and maneuver, so stress shoots were common. Weapon systems varied from M4 to shot gun, demolitions, and Machine Gun. We frequently used multiple weapon systems on a range.

Focused Traffic Control Point (TCP) training, local national engagements, limited language training, and small arms ranges. Our Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation focused on the invasion of a country which did not match our mission set.

Our preparation for Iraq focused on four elements: gunnery, high intensity tasks, counterinsurgency tasks, and sniper employment.

Gunnery consisted of M3 Bradley gunnery and HMMWV gunnery.

The high intensity tasks focused on reconnaissance fundamentals, route, zone, and area reconnaissance, observation post occupation and sustainment, platoon mounted movement techniques in open terrain, and platoon dismounted movement techniques in open terrain. [Subjects organization was preparing for a rotation to the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, CA]

Counterinsurgency tasks included basic language training, tactical questioning techniques, room clearing, sensitive site exploitation, platoon movement in an urban

environment, and platoon dismounted maneuver in an urban environment.

Sniper employment consisted of each team leader attending the sniper school, maximizing range time utilizing the Barrett .50 caliber sniper rifle and the M24 sniper rifle, practicing infiltration and exfiltration with the scout platoon, and executing short duration and long duration observation posts.

Describe this training?

The LPDs were collective forums that consisted of the entire Squadron's officer leadership. We assembled in a variety of venues and participated in vignettes, country briefs, and reviewed current Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for the ongoing conflict. Additionally, we built OIF binders to consolidate smart cards and Center for Army Lesson's Learned (CALL) products for future reference.

The key leader engagement exercise was set up like an actual meeting with tribal leadership to obtain specific information requirements from them in relation to an enemy personality. As the personnel were expatriates of Iraq, they were well versed in the nuances of the meetings and provided a very real glimpse of what our actual experiences reflected. Additionally, prior to the execution of the key leader engagement, they gave us feedback on how to interact in ways that were not offensive to our hosts.

The STX were designed to replicate the missions we would potentially execute in OIF. They were multiple day training events that stressed our abilities to execute Reconnaissance and Security tasks and operations designed to simulate OIF missions.

The training the squadron conducted was weak. It did not focus on the basic Soldier skills needed for the environment we were headed. [Subject described a high intensity train-up for a Counterinsurgency mission]

To train these tasks the battalion scheduled 2 gunneries before deployment. Bradley crews qualified on both the Bradley platform and the HMMWV platform. Prior to the National Training Center, the platoon conducted 2 reconnaissance and security lanes that tested the platoon in an urban environment. They consisted of mounted and dismounted movement, urban observation post establishment, time sensitive target missions (cordon and search), and sniper infiltration and exfiltration.

Was this training sufficient for you to be successful?

The training provided a useful baseline to take into the deployment, but was not sufficient to guarantee overall success during the deployment. It did allow me to be more aware of how to behave with Iraqi nationals which set me up for successful interactions; however, greater focus on teaching Platoon Leaders and Platoon Sergeants how to successfully negotiate with foreign nationals would allow them to better leverage situations during deployments. Also, increasing the amount of contact with foreign nationals from the actual country the Soldiers are deploying to enables a more complete understanding of how to interact in a respectful manner.

I felt well trained for traditional cavalry operations: prolonged and decentralized operations, mounted engagements, and reporting.

I believe that our training was sufficient for us to be successful. Most of it was focused on shooting and not much on talking. As a result, our soldiers were a bit high strung when they first arrived in Iraq and had to adjust their weapons posture to fit the more permissive environment.

More language training would be very welcomed.

No this training was not sufficient. We did not focus on dismounted operations

which were a key skill that mounted cavalry Soldiers have. When we moved into country we relied primarily on our HMMWVs and not our skills dismounted. We conducted long mounted movements.

The platoon performed well in combat. Platoon was assigned task of executing time sensitive targets in a Baghdad area of operations.

-Where there any tasks you conducted while deployed that you feel you were not trained for?

Securing and running an international border crossing. I was located at the Rabiya Border crossing between Syria and Iraq and literally told go secure the crossing point. At this location, I was the senior leader and basically had free reign to allow people to cross or not based on my call. There was minimal guidance from higher headquarters, no guidance from the State Department, and a series of Iraqi Borders and Customs Officials who were constantly communicating with officials in Baghdad on the status of the site. The situation forced me to repeatedly ask higher headquarters for specific guidance when Iraqi officials wanted to allow personnel or vehicles to cross the border and our U.S. guidance was that nobody was to cross. Additional training prior to the deployment on how the Iraqi governmental systems generically work and how we interact with those agencies would have helped. Also, training with members of the U.S. Border Patrol prior to and during the deployment would have aided with search techniques and border enforcement.

The critical gap I found was dismounted operations in urban terrain. The emphasis on CQB in urban operations is misplaced. The emphasis needs to be on movement between buildings and engagements from building-building. I have heard very

few stories of anyone actually engaging someone in a CQB-style situation (inside of a building), but everyone has been engaged in an urban environment.

Organizationally, a Stryker Reconnaissance platoon simply has too little combat power. We had too few dismounts to operate independently of our vehicles, as one casualty would have required the whole dismounted element for CASEVAC back to the vehicles. Our pintle-mounted M2s and MK19s left us dramatically inferior to the infantry Strykers (Remote Weapon Systems) in terms of firepower. Therefore, the only missions we could conduct on an equal footing with the infantry would be economy-of-force missions (reconnaissance, convoy escort, etc.). The argument that that's what we were designed for seems unrealistic. We have been conducting COIN and counter-guerrilla operations for close to a decade, and we (the Cavalry) simply do not bring much to the table.

I understand this paper is about training, but my biggest issue is that no amount of training, in my experience, can compensate for our lack resources. I am in a HBCT Reconnaissance Squadron now and the problem is even worse, with each troop having only two scout platoons, albeit somewhat larger. This is insane! We require more men.

While down range we handled large sums of money. No training was conducted to prepare us for this occurrence. Working with civil administrators and government officials is also an area where our training was somewhat deficient.

More training on dismounted techniques. Integrate more infantry skills into mounted maneuver so that Soldiers can move mounted and dismounted. More training on integrated mounted and dismounted maneuver, especially at the Troop level. More

combined arms live-fire training integrating indirect assets from 60mm mortars up through close air support.

None.

Do you have any other thoughts on training scout platoons?

The Scout platoons in the Stryker Reconnaissance Squadrons are undermanned for conducting dismounted operations. At full strength, the platoons have 21 personnel. Given the current fight which routinely has personnel on environmental leave, the platoons are always short-handed. When operating 4 vehicles, a minimum of 8 personnel have to remain with the vehicles to secure them properly. This generally leaves 7-10 personnel available to dismount which is insufficient for most dismounted operations between providing security and conducting observation posts, TCPs, ambushes, etc. The platoons need to train short-handed to fully understand how to compensate for a lack of personnel. Also, the platoons need to be augmented with additional 19D Soldiers to a similar personnel strength as an Infantry Scout platoons have. Scout platoons must also receive advanced marksmanship training and Joint Fires Observer training to maximize their lethality given their limited personnel numbers.

Bottom line for me is that if a scout platoon leader can conduct a platoon live fire he can probably talk to some people in a friendly manner too. I don't think our training was flawed, but additional training on civil, language, and cultural matters would be helpful.

Scouts should focus on training to the standards established in FM 3-20.98 and unit SOPs.

The concept of mixing 3 Bradleys with 5 HMMWVs degraded the platoon's ability to conduct continuous reconnaissance. It limited maneuverability in urban and rural terrain. It increased our signature. It also encouraged direct fire contact with the enemy as opposed to unobserved reconnaissance. Getting rid of the Bradley would create more time for the Platoon Leader to train on the core competencies for this type of combat.

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